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FROM NONDISCRIMINATION TO
CIVIL MARRIAGE
Elizabeth Burleson*
Denying basic civil rights to any individual denies such rights to
everyone. As William Faulkner explained, we must be free not because
we claim freedom, but because we practice it. This Article analyzes the
continuing constitutional struggle for civil rights on the basis of sexual
orientation. This Article engages in comparative constitutionalism and
considers the evolution of nondiscrimination measures. This analysis
concludes that recognition of constitutional civil rights on the basis of
sexual orientation facilitates nondiscrimination and supports equitable
relationships and parenting, and recommends that governments and civil
society affirmatively recognize and support the civil rights of same-sex
families.
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INTRODUCTION
Currently, five states allow same-sex couples to marry:' Connecti-
cut, 2 Iowa, 3 Massachusetts, 4 New Hampshire, 5 and Vermont. 6 New
York recognizes marriages by same-sex couples legally entered into in
other jurisdictions.7 Five states and the District of Columbia 8 provide the
1 See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition
Laws, Sept. 1, 2009, at 1, http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship-RecognitionLaws_
Map.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality].
2 See CON. GEN. STAT. 46b-38bb (2009); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d
407, 411-12 (Conn. 2008) (holding that Connecticut's statutory prohibition against same-sex
couples marrying violated substantive due process and equal protection rights guaranteed
under the state constitution). See generally Bennett Klein & Daniel Redman, From Separate
To Equal: Litigating Marriage Equality in a Civil Union State, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1381 (2009).
3 See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); see also Iowa Judge Approves
Gay Weddings, BBC NEws, Aug 31, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/69
71696.stm ("The Iowa decision came after six gay couples sued Polk County in 2005 after it
refused to give them marriage licences."). See generally Ian C. Bartrum, Commentary, Same-
Sex Marriage in the Heartland: The Case for Legislative Minimalism in Crafting Religious
Exemptions, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 8 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.
org/assets/fl/108/bartrum.pdf.
4 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 207 (2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that restricting access to the protections and benefits of civil
marriage violates the Massachusetts Constitution); see also Todd Brower, It's Not Just Shop-
ping, Urban Lofts, and the Lesbian Gay-By Boom: How Sexual Orientation Demographics
Can Inform Family Courts, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 36 (2009).
5 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457-1-a (2009); Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Ap-
proves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19 ("The New Hampshire legisla-
ture approved revisions to a same-sex marriage bill on Wednesday, and Gov. John Lynch
promptly signed the legislation, making the state the sixth to let gay couples wed.").
6 See An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Promote Equality in Civil Marriage,
H.B. 275 (Vt. 2007); PBS Newshour: Iowa, Vermont Push Gay Marriage Rights Forward
(PBS television broadcast Apr. 8, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/
jan-june09/gaymarriage-04-08.html [hereinafter PBS Newshour] ("Vermont's legislature and
the top court of Iowa delivered legal victories in recent weeks to those seeking the right of
same-sex couples to marry.").
7 See Robin Shulman, N.Y. to Recognize Other Jurisdictions' Gay Marriages, WASH.
POST, May 30, 2008, at A2.
8 See Theo Emery, Bid to Block Recognition of Unions Fails, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2009, at A13 ("The District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics rejected a proposed
ballot question intended to block city recognition of same-sex marriages from other places.
Last month, the City Council voted 12 to I to recognize same-sex marriages from other juris-
dictions, a decision widely seen as a prelude to an inevitable vote on legalizing same-sex
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equivalent of state-level spousal rights to same-sex couples.9 California
had been the second state to allow same-sex couples to marry.10 Yet in
November of 2008, after a $35 million campaign by opponents of same-
sex marriage,1" California voters approved Proposition 8 to add the fol-
lowing sentence to the state constitution: "Only marriage between a man
and a woman is valid or recognized in California."12 Proposition 8 ren-
ders the California state constitution in conflict with itself, stating that
marriage between same-sex couples is illegal while the California Su-
preme Court has otherwise held that the state constitution's equal protec-
tion clause would be violated by a ban on same-sex marriage.13 The
constitutional struggle for civil rights on the basis of sexual orientation
continues.
This Article analyzes constitutional principles regarding the recog-
nition of civil rights on the basis of sexual orientation. Part I addresses
civil marriage for same-sex couples, particularly Connecticut's recent ex-
pansion of rights under its constitution. This part also addresses the fed-
eral Defense of Marriage Act's impact on same-sex couples that marry in
Connecticut. Part II engages in comparative constitutionalism, assessing
Canada's struggle to be inclusive. Part II analyzes European integration
and identity generally, and European citizenship based on human rights
in particular. Part IV addresses the evolution of recognizing civil rights
on the basis of sexual orientation in the United States, with Part V assess-
ing federal and Part VI analyzing state nondiscrimination measures. Part
VII considers minority civil rights protection in light of constitutional
provisions addressing religion. This Article concludes that the means are
the ends-recognition of constitutional civil rights on the basis of sexual
orientation facilitates nondiscrimination and supports equitable relation-
ships and parenting. Governments and civil society should recognize
marriages in the capital. Pastors opposing same-sex marriage sought the citywide referendum
in hopes of reversing that decision, but the election board said the referendum was not allowed
under the city's 1977 Human Rights Act.").
9 See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 1 (listing California, the
District of Columbia, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington); see also Nancy J.
Knauer, LGBT Elder Law: Toward Equity In Aging, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 43 n.275
(2009) ("In 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that limiting access to the protections
and benefits of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution, but it did
not require the state to permit same-sex couples to marry.... In response, the New Jersey state
legislature enacted the Civil Union Act which extends all the benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples who enter a civil union.").
10 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008) (ruling that sexual orientation
is insufficient grounds upon which to preclude or restrict the fundamental right to marry pursu-
ant to the California Constitution); Jesse McKinley, A Landmark Day in California as Same-
Sex Marriages Begin to Take Hold, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008, at A19.
11 See PBS Newshour, supra note 6.
12 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
13 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384.
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and support the civil rights of same-sex families. As William Faulkner
explained, "We must be free not because we claim freedom, but because
we practice it.''14
I. MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
A number of states have concluded that restricting civil marriage to
heterosexual couples violates same-sex couples' rights to constitutional
equal protection under their respective state constitutions.1 5 For exam-
ple, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that discrimination against gay
and lesbian persons is subject to intermediate scrutiny, which has histori-
cally been used to review laws that employ quasi-suspect classifications
such as those based on gender. 16
A. The Constitution State's Analysis of its Constitution
In 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Kerrigan v. Commis-
sioner of Public Health,1 7 ruled that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect classification under the equal protection
provisions of the Connecticut constitution, and thus subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny. 18 In 2004, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
(GLAD), on behalf of eight gay and lesbian Connecticut couples who
had been denied marriage licenses, filed suit in Kerrigan based upon the
equal protection and due process provisions of the Connecticut constitu-
tion. 19 While Kerrigan was still being litigated, Connecticut passed leg-
14 WILLIAM FAULKNER, Go DowN, MosEs 255 (Vintage 1990) (1942).
15 See, e.g., Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (holding that Iowa code
Section 595.2, which restricted marriage to heterosexual couples, violated the equal protection
provision of the Iowa constitution); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008) (holding that laws that restrict civil marriage to heterosexual couples violate same-sex
couples' state constitutional equal protection rights); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that limitations on protections, benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage to opposite sex individuals lacked rational basis and violated state equal protec-
tion principles).
16 See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 412.
17 957 A.2d 407.
18 See id. at 412. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant summary judg-
ment and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, who were eight same-sex couples denied marriage
licenses by the town clerk of Madison, Connecticut. See id. at 411. The court noted that "for
purposes of determining whether a group is entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status-
and, in contrast to the considerations of historical discrimination and whether the group's dis-
tinguishing characteristic bears on the ability of its members to participate in and contribute to
society-immutability is not a requirement, but a factor." Id. at 428 n.20 (internal citation
omitted).
19 See id. at 412-13; GLAD, How To GET MARRmD IN CONNECT'cUT 1 (2009), http://
www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/how-to-get-married-ct.pdf.
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islation that allowed same-sex couples to enter into civil unionS.20
GLAD argued in Kerrigan, however, that this separate scheme was still
unequal, in violation of the Connecticut constitution.21 The Connecticut
Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs, and held:
Interpreting our state constitutional provisions in accor-
dance with firmly established equal protection principles
leads inevitably to the conclusion that gay persons are
entitled to marry the otherwise qualified same sex part-
ner of their choice. To decide otherwise would require
us to apply one set of constitutional principles to gay
persons and another to all others. The guarantee of equal
protection under the law, and our obligation to uphold
that command, forbids us from doing so. In accordance
with these state constitutional requirements, same sex
couples cannot be denied the freedom to marry. 22
The court continued:
[R]eligious autonomy is not threatened by recognizing
the right of same sex couples to marry civilly. Religious
freedom will not be jeopardized by the marriage of same
sex couples because religious organizations that oppose
same sex marriage as irreconcilable with their beliefs
will not be required to perform same sex marriages or
otherwise to condone same sex marriage or relations.
Because, however, marriage is a state sanctioned and
state regulated institution, religious objections to same
sex marriage cannot play a role in our determination of
whether constitutional principles of equal protection
mandate same sex marriage. 23
Kerrigan clarified further that extending marriage to same-sex
couples does not impact the rights of opposite sex couples: "[R]emoving
the barrier to same-sex marriage is no different than the action taken by
the United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, when it invali-
dated laws barring marriage between persons of different races. ' '24 Ker-
rigan found that "the bigotry and hatred that gay persons have faced are
akin to, and, in certain respects, perhaps even more severe than, those
20 See Act Concerning Civil Unions, Pub. Act 05-10, 2005 Conn. Acts 13 (Reg. Sess.)
(codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to 46b-38pp (West 2009)); see also GLAD,
supra note 19, at 1.
21 See Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89, 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006), rev'd, 957 A.2d 407
(Conn. 2008).
22 See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008).
23 Id. at 475.
24 Id. at 475-76 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
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confronted by some groups that have been accorded heightened judicial
protection. '25 The court concluded:
Like the political gains that women had made prior to
their recognition as a quasi-suspect class, the political
advances that gay persons have attained afford them in-
adequate protection, standing alone, in view of the deep-
seated and pernicious nature of the prejudice and antipa-
thy that they continue to face. Today, moreover, women
have far greater political power than gay persons, yet
they continue to be accorded status as a quasi-suspect
class. ... We conclude, therefore, that, to the extent that
gay persons possess some political power, it does not
disqualify them from recognition as a quasi-suspect class
under the state constitution in view of the pervasive and
invidious discrimination to which they historically have
been subjected due to an innate personal characteristic
that has absolutely no bearing on their ability to perform
in or contribute to society.26
The Connecticut legislature responded and passed the Marriage
Codification Bill, which Governor Rell signed into law.27 In addition to
25 Id. at 446.
26 Id. at 461. The court highlighted the limits of gay persons' political clout in
Connecticut:
[A]lthough the legislature eventually enacted the gay rights law, its enactment was
preceded by nearly a decade of numerous, failed attempts at passage. In addition,
the bill that did become law provides more limited protection than the proposals that
had preceded it, all of which would have added sexual orientation to the existing
nondiscrimination laws and would have treated the classification in the same manner
as other protected classes .... [T]he legislation that ultimately emerged from this
process passed only after a compromise was reached that resulted in, inter alia, an
unprecedented proviso expressing the position of the legislature that it does not con-
done homosexuality. Thus, to the extent that those civil rights laws, as well as the
civil union law, reflect the fact that gay persons wield a measure of political power,
the public policy articulated in § 46a-81r is clear evidence of the limits of that politi-
cal influence.
Id. at 449-50; cf id. at 477 n.42 ("Although we recognize that Connecticut is a leader in terms
of the number of openly gay and lesbian lawmakers elected to the legislature, we view that fact
as indicative of the political weakness of gay persons nationwide, and not as indicative of the
political strength of gay persons in this state."); Matt Foreman, Gay is Good, 32 NoVA L. REv.
557, 567 (2008) ("[L]ess than one-tenth of one percent (0.08%) of all elected officials in this
country are openly LGBT.").
27 An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of the
State for Same Sex Couples, Pub. Act 09-14 (codified at CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17b, 45a,
46a, 46b (West 2009)); see also Chase Matthews, Connecticut Gov. Signs Gay Marriage into
Law, CHI. PRIDE, Apr. 23, 2009, available at http://www.chicagopride.com/news/article.cfm/
articleid/7272400 ("The Marriage Codification Bill, which now redefines marriage in Con-
necticut as 'the legal union of two people,' passed 28-7 in the Senate and 100-44 in the House
of Representatives. Previously, the law was defined as the union of a man and a woman.").
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codifying the Connecticut Supreme Court's Kerrigan decision, the stat-
ute also promulgates that civil unions will convert into marriages on Oc-
tober 1, 2010.28 Currently, Connecticut uses BRIDE/GROOMISPOUSE
on its marriage licenses.29 The Connecticut Department of Public Health
explains that
Connecticut General Statutes §§ 46b-21 through 46b-35
govern the requirements for marriage, and shall apply
equally to all marriages. Furthermore, same sex couples
who were married in Massachusetts will be recognized
as married in Connecticut as will those of California dur-
ing the period in which marriages between same sex
couples were legal .... 30
Kerrigan is an important decision, recognizing the civil right to
marry and extending this right to same-sex couples. This case provides a
model for other jurisdictions to recognize and support the civil rights of
same-sex families.
B. State-based Legal Complexities Beyond Extending Civil Marriage
to Same-sex Couples
In 2002, Connecticut adopted Public Act 02-105, allowing an adult
designator to name an adult designee to make certain decisions on his or
her behalf, and giving the designee certain rights and responsibilities. 31
In nursing homes, for example, the designee must receive advance notice
28 See An Act Implementing the Guarantee of Equal Protection under the Constitution of
the State for Same Sex Couples § 12, 2009 Conn. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act 09-14 (West) (codified
at various sections of CONN. GEN. STAT.); see also Associated Press, Conn. Lawmakers Make
Gay Marriage Official, CBS NEWS, Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/
23/national/main4963235.shtml (noting that "religious organizations and associations are not
required to provide services, goods or facilities for same-sex wedding ceremonies," but that
the "bill also strips language from a 1991 state anti-discrimination law that says Connecticut
does not condone 'homosexuality or bisexuality or any equivalent lifestyle,' require the teach-
ing of homosexuality or bisexuality 'as an acceptable lifestyle,' set quotas for hiring gay work-
ers or authorize recognition of same-sex marriage.").
29 See, e.g., State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health, License and Certificate
of Marriage, available at http://www.glad.orgluploads/docs/publications/ct-marriage-license.
pdf.
30 State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health, Frequently Asked Questions
About Same-Sex Marriages, http://www.ct.gov/dph/lib/dph/communications/pdf/faqs-for_
same sex.pdf; see also id. ("The requirements for entering into a same-sex marriage are the
same for those entering into an opposite-sex marriage.").
31 An Act Authorizing the Designation of a Person to Assume Ownership of a Motor
Vehicle upon the Death of the Owner and Authorizing the Designation of a Person for Certain
Other Purposes, 2002 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 02-105 (West) (codified at various sections of
CONN. GEN. STAT.); see GLAD, supra note 19, at 30-35. For instance, the designation docu-
ment must be honored in the workplace. Employers must call the employee's designee in case
of emergency. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-5 lJ (2003).
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and consultation of involuntary, non-emergency room transfers. 32 The
designee has the right to private visits with the patient.33 In order to
allow same-sex partners to share financial, medical, and end-of-life deci-
sions, same-sex couples should review their existing legal documents to
comply with Public Act 02-105 since the rights and responsibilities to
which the designee is entitled under the Act overlap with some of those
set forth in bundled documents often called "Health Care Instructions,
Appointment of Health Care Agent, Appointment of Attorney in Fact for
Health Care Decisions, Designation of Conservator for Future Incapacity
and Document of Anatomical Gift." 34 These provisions set forth a
framework for recognizing the civil rights of same-sex families that
should be available beyond a single state.
C. Impact of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
Maneuvering the legal challenges of marriage for same-sex couples
remains fraught with unnecessary and discriminatory legal complexities
due to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).35 The protections
that marriage equality afford in the five states that allow same-sex
couples to marry do not extend to the federal realm and can disappear
when couples leave these five states. In response to the Hawaii Supreme
Court decision in Baehr v. Levin, which held that the state's prohibition
on same-sex marriage constituted discrimination, 36 Congress passed and
President Clinton signed the Defense of Marriage Act.37 DOMA estab-
lished a federal definition of "marriage" and "spouse" in Title 1 of the
United States Code by providing that for all federal purposes, marriage
must be between "one man and one woman as husband and wife."38
DOMA further promulgated that no state would be required to recognize
same-sex marriage entered into lawfully in other states. 39 Since this
time, Matt Foreman notes that "forty-one states have passed laws or state
constitutional amendments to prohibit the recognition of same-sex mar-
32 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-550 (2003); see GLAD, supra note 19, at 32.
33 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-550 (2003); see GLAD, supra note 19, at 32.
34 See GLAD, supra note 19, at 35; cf. JULIE JASON, JULIE JASON'S GUIDE TO CONNECTI-
CUT PROBATE 317 (AuthorHouse 2006).
35 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
36 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also Human Rights Campaign, Hawaii:
Baehr v. Lewin, http://www.hrc.org/laws and elections/i 3011 .htm ("[T]he Supreme Court of
Hawaii held that a statute excluding same-sex couples from marriage was discrimination on
the basis of sex. The court sent the case back to trial to decide whether the statute could
survive strict scrutiny.").
37 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; see also 142 CONG. REC.
S 10100-02 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Burns referring to the Baehr decision
as the impetus for passing DOMA).
38 Defense of Marriage Act, § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7.
39 Defense of Marriage Act, § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
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riage-that is, to deprive a tiny minority of a right the majority sees as a
fundamental human right." 40
Even with a valid marriage from one of the five states that now
offers marriage, a same-sex couple is currently ineligible for the 1,138
federal statutory provisions dependent upon marital status due to
DOMA. 4 1 Nancy J. Knauer explains:
Regardless of how individuals choose to order their lives
and their relationships, the law continues to privilege
those relationships defined by blood, marriage, and
adoption. In the absence of recognition of same sex rela-
tionships, a same sex partner is a legal stranger because
there is no way to make a same sex partner legal family.
For LGBT elders with a chosen family, this legal disabil-
ity extends beyond just their partner and includes all of
their potential caregivers. A same sex partner will be
considered "next of kin" to some extent in eleven states,
but the other members of a chosen family remain legal
strangers in all fifty states.
42
For example, an employee of the State of Connecticut, a Connecti-
cut county, or a Connecticut municipality will be able to extend health
insurance to his or her same-sex spouse whether they are married or
within a civil union.43 Due to DOMA, however, federal health plans will
not be extended to same-sex spouses of federal employees. 44 Self-em-
ployed individuals in Connecticut can buy health insurance coverage for
a same-sex spouse identical to a self-employed heterosexual married in-
dividual. 45 Private sector employees are in a more complex position
since employers may not have to extend health insurance to same-sex
partners. Similarly, for tax purposes, GLAD states that
[a]lthough a same sex married couple will need to file as
"single" on the federal income tax return, GLAD recom-
mends that each member of the couple indicate the mar-
riage in some way on his or her federal return. This can
40 Foreman, supra note 26, at 565.
41 See id. at 561 (citing Dayna K. Shah, Associate General Counsel, U.S. General Ac-
counting Office to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf).
42 Knauer, supra note 9, at 43; see also Anthony Faiola, Civil Union Laws Don't Ensure
Benefits: Same-Sex N.J. Couples Find That Employers Can Get Around New Rules, WASH.
POST, June 30, 2007, at A3 ("[W]hen companies choose to follow federal laws, they often cite
the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as a union between a man and
woman as a reason to deny coverage to same-sex couples.").
43 See GLAD, supra note 19, at 25.
44 See id.
45 See id.
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be done either by attaching a sheet that explains this or
by putting an asterisk after single and indicate that he or
she is in a same sex marriage and provide the date of the
marriage. This way no one can later claim that you
fraudulently indicated your marital status. This is espe-
cially important since income tax returns are often used
for other purposes, such as to qualify for a mortgage, etc.
However, a same sex married or civil union couple will
be able to file a Connecticut state income tax return in
the same manner as a different-sex married couple (i.e.,
either jointly or married filing separately). In order to do
this, the couple will need to fill out a "dummy" federal
income tax return as married (this return will never be
filed) and enter the figures from this return on the Con-
necticut state income tax return. 46 '
Same-sex couples continue to be disadvantaged by the need for poten-
tially costly legal advice to navigate the remaining patchwork of mar-
riage recognition.
DOMA is patently unfair, if not unconstitutional, and should be
struck down or repealed.47 Advantages of doing so are numerous for
issues determined by federal recognition of marriage. Many issues deter-
mined by state law already hinge on recognition of marriage. 48 First,
children of same-sex families would have far greater access to health
care benefits. Second, spouses would be able to speak on behalf of an ill
partner. A same-sex partner would be assured hospital visitation rights
since a patient's legally recognized spouse or next-of-kin is allowed to
visit a patient. Third, a partner would have a better chance of becoming
the guardian of the couple's child as courts generally appoint a person's
legal spouse in preference to other people. An unmarried partner is a
legal stranger in such proceedings. Fourth, members of a same-sex fam-
ily would be able to make use of the federal Family Medical Leave Act
to take care of sick family members.49 Fifth, same-sex partners would be
46 Id. at 27.
47 See Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Human Rights Campaign Delivers Sur-
vey to Congress Showing Overwhelming Support for Repealing Defense of Marriage Act
(Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.hrc.org/13508.htm (noting that the HRC "delivered
to Congress nearly 50,000 survey responses showing the concrete harms DOMA brings to the
lives of LGBT Americans and their families"); see, e.g., LISA BENNE'rT & GARY J. GATES,
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE COST OF MARRIAGE INEQUALITY TO CHILDREN AND THEIR
SAME-SEx PARENTS (Apr. 13, 2004) (explaining how the invalidity of same-sex marriages
limits health care benefits for children of same-sex families).
48 Cf. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-57 (Mass. 2003) (survey-
ing the benefits of government recognition of marriage).
49 See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2611(13) (2006) ("The term
'spouse' means a husband or wife, as the case may be.").
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able to make use of second parent adoption provisions more easily since
the married spouse of a person has the unquestioned right to adopt that
parent's child without terminating the first parent's rights.50 Finally,
there would be an enormous societal benefit from simply promoting
equality.
There are other legal hurdles for same-sex parents that DOMA ex-
acerbates, even in jurisdictions that recognize same-sex marriage. For
example, if both same-sex spouses to a Connecticut marriage or civil
union were already legal parents through joint or second-parent adoption
then they remain parents. 51 Yet, if one spouse was not a legal parent
before, then the marriage or civil union would not turn that spouse into a
legal parent; the non-legal parent would need to adopt the child. 52 An
adoption decree from a court is a legal judgment that would be recog-
nized widely beyond Connecticut. 53 Further, while "[i]n Connecticut, a
child born into a marriage or civil union is presumed to be the child of
both parties[,] ... this is just a presumption and does not have the same
effect as a court judgment." 54 Indeed, in light of DOMA, this same-sex
marriage may not be recognized by other states.55
Equality would be facilitated by automatically establishing legal
parenthood on the state level, greatly enhancing parents' abilities to
make medical and financial decisions on behalf of their children. 56 Co-
50 Human Rights Campaign, Second-Parent Adoption, http://www.hrc.org/issues/parent-
ing/adoptions/2385.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Campaign, Sec-
ond Parent Adoption].
51 GLAD, supra note 19, at 23.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. ("Entering into a marriage or civil union may complicate matters if you are in the
process of adopting a child or considering adoption in the future.").
55 Id.
56 Cf. id.; see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation Of Sexuality In International
Human Rights Law And Theory, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 797, 812 (2008). Many countries,
including several that prohibit same-sex marriage, now allow same-sex couples or single
homosexuals to assume custody of their own or their partners' children, or to adopt unrelated
children, on a nondiscriminatory basis. Fellmeth, supra, at 864 (listing Belgium, Brazil, Ca-
nada, Denmark, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and some provinces of Australia as allowing this). Fellmeth further notes, "In [sev-
eral countries in] Europe, the custody of a sexual minority's biological child can be shared
with nonbiological same-sex parents. In some cases, these rights are even automatic, as in the
Netherlands, where a woman upon marriage to another woman acquires joint custody of the
other's prior children without any formalities." Id. at 864-65; cf. E.B. v. France, App. No.
43546/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (2008) (holding that member states are not permitted to discrimi-
nate on the basis of sexual orientation in adoption proceedings); see also Kathleen A. Doty,
From Frett6 to E.B.: The European Court of Human Rights on Gay and Lesbian Adoption, 18
LAW & SEXUALITY 121, 138 (2009) ("With respect to relationship recognition, European Leg-
islation is all over the map. Of the forty-seven Member States of the Council of Europe, four
States allow marriage, twelve have some system of registered domestic partnerships, two rec-
ognize registered co-habitation, nine allow for unregistered co-habitation, and twenty-six pro-
vide no legal recognition for gay and lesbian relationships at all.").
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parent adoption for any current non-legal parents can serve in the
meantime to minimize future legal disputes. A majority of states allow
second-parent adoption.57 Yet only by a repeal of DOMA could the civil
rights of same-sex families be fully recognized.
D. International Recognition of Civil Marriage
The Netherlands, 58 Belgium,59 Spain,60 South Africa,61 Norway, 62
Sweden, 63 and Canada64 have extended civil marriage to same-sex
couples. 65 Noting that Canada did not recognize Catholic and Jewish
marriages until 1847 and 1857, respectively, Glass and Kubasek explain
the importance of government recognition of marriage:
[M]arriage is taken for granted as a primary institution in
which unpaid caretaking work of one partner is subsi-
dized or supported by the market work of the other part-
ner . . . . One's marital status continues to impact
significantly one's access to a wide variety of private
and public social benefits, including joint and survivor
pension benefits, tax exemptions, parental rights and
benefits, automatic inheritance, income support pro-
grams, and joint insurance and property ownership....
As a result of this state-provided security and of the con-
tinuing significance of the marriage contract in private
and public social provisioning, married individuals in the
United States and Canada earn more, accumulate more
wealth over the life course, and are better protected
57 See Human Rights Campaign, Second Parent Adoption, supra note 50.
58 See Wet Openstelling Huwelijk (Act on the Opening up of Marriage), Staatsblad van
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] nr.9 (2001) (Neth.).
59 See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Same-Sex Marriage: Redefining Marriage
Around the World (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=235.
60 The Spanish parliament approved full same-sex marriage in June 2005. See Spanish
MPs Approve Gay Marriages, BBC NEWS, June 30, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/4636133.stm; Jennifer Green, Spain Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST,
July 1, 2005, at A14.
61 The South African Constitutional Court held the common law prohibition on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC)
(S. Aft.). The South African parliament adopted marriage for same-sex couples in November
2006. See Civil Union Act (Act 17 of 2006); see also Fellmeth supra note 56, at 854.
62 See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, supra note 59.
63 See id.
64 See 2005 Civil Marriage Act, C-38, 38th Parliament, 1st Sess. (2005) (codified at 33
Stat.) (Can.); see also Fellmeth supra note 56, at 854.
65 Cf. GLAD, supra note 19, at 4, 9 (noting that while Connecticut, Massachusetts, Iowa,
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Canada have no residency requirement for same sex couples to
become married, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, and Norway allow
same-sex couples to marry, but most of these countries have requirements that make it difficult
for non-citizens to marry).
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against economic risk than are non-married
individuals. 66
Canadian family law is nationally legislated. As a result, lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (collectively LGBT) people did not have
to request equality provisions from separate state legislatures as has oc-
curred in the United States.67 Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms states, "Every individual is equal before and under
the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability." 68 Glass and Kubasek explain:
Much of the justification for finding that limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex partners violates the equal treat-
ment guaranteed by Section 15 of the Canadian Charter
similarly supports a claim that so limiting marriage
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 69
This same rationale was employed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court. In finding that the state lacked a rational basis for denying mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples, 70 the court cited the Canadian courts
then looked to relevant state constitutional provisions. 71
66 Christy M. Glass & Nancy Kubasek, The Evolution Of Same-Sex Marriage in Ca-
nada: Lessons the U.S. Can Learn from Their Northern Neighbor Regarding Same-Sex Mar-
riage Rights, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 143, 155 (2008); see also John G. Culhane, Marriage
Equality? First, Justify Marriage (If You Can), 1 DREXEL L. REv. 485 (2009); Fellmeth, supra
note 56, at 847-48 (noting that governments subsidize marriage: "[T]he state typically grants
many benefits to the married couple in the form of rights to community property, pensions,
tenancy rights, inheritance, immigration rights, tax benefits, prison and hospital visitation
rights, and the right to refuse to testify against one's spouse in a criminal prosecution.");
Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1395, 1401-02 (2008) ("De-
spite the abrogation of coverture and the renegotiation of women's citizenship status within the
modem polity, feminist legal theorists argue that marriage continues to produce inequalities,
reifying gendered caregiving roles and stymieing efforts to achieve economic equality."). See
generally Shah, supra note 41.
67 See Glass and Kubasek, supra note 66, at 149 ("Canada repealed its sodomy laws in
1969 .... In the United States, by contrast, sodomy laws remained part of state criminal
statutes until 2003 when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down criminal prohibition against
homosexual sodomy at the state level.").
68 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, § 15(1); see also Glass & Kubasek, supra note 66,
at 163 ("In order to pursue a complaint under Section 15, a person must prove not only that a
law or policy violates Section 15, but also that the discrimination he or she is seeking to rectify
is not a 'reasonable limit prescribed by law.' ").
69 Glass & Kubasek, supra note 66, at 200.
70 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
71 See id. at 966 n.31.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal in Halpern concluded that "to freeze
the definition of marriage to whatever meaning it had in 1867 is contrary
to Canada's jurisprudence of progressive constitutional interpretation. '72
Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires that there be
proportionality and a rational connection between the objective of a law
and the means selected to achieve it,7 3 a standard on par with the lowest
level of scrutiny that federal courts in the United States apply to a law
passed by the federal government. 74
As governments around the globe extend recognition of civil mar-
riage to same-sex couples, a body of law is developing from which juris-
dictions can adopt best practices. In this way, LGBT individuals and
families can be protected within the fields of family law, human rights,
and civil liberties. Jurisdictions that have yet to do so should recognize
civil marriage and nondiscrimination rights of LGBT individuals without
further delay.
II. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
"We deal here not with abstractions but with people. "75
In 1977, Qu6bec became the first jurisdiction in North America to
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. 76 Given the rest of Canada's
opposition to Qu6bec's Parti Qu6b6cois sovereigntist government, the re-
vision of the Qu6bec Charter of Rights to include sexual orientation at-
tracted little attention.77 In fact, the province was known instead for its
mistreatment of sexual minorities. The Montreal police, in particular,
72 Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161, 162 (Can.); see also id. at 187
(establishing the unconstitutionality of same-sex exclusion from marriage since "no one ... is
suggesting that procreation and childrearing are the only purposes of marriage, or the only
reasons why couples choose to marry. Intimacy, companionship, societal recognition, eco-
nomic benefits, the blending of two families, to name a few, .are other reasons that couples
choose to marry.").
73 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 1.
74 See Glass & Kubasek, supra note 66, at 203 ("The Canadian court quickly disposed of
that justification, pointing out that while same-sex couples cannot biologically bear children
together, the same applies to many opposite-sex couples .... [and] having children is clearly
not the only reason people choose to marry." (referencing Halpern v. Toronto (City) [2003] 65
O.R. 3d 161, 187)).
75 DAVID RAYSIDE, ON THE FRINGE: GAYS & LESBIANS IN POLITICS 105 (Cornell Univer-
sity Press 1998) (quoting Allan Rock, Justice Minister, at the House of Commons (Apr. 30,
1996)).
76 Sexual identity politics have played a role in the construction of Qu6bec's national
identity. Qu6bec's struggle for sovereignty has allowed it to reconsider its human rights provi-
sions. See Qu6bec Charts des Droits et Libertis de la Personne, RSQ c. C-12, ss. 10, 137.
77 In 1986 Ontario included sexual orientation in the Ontario Human Rights Code as part
of omnibus bill to bring its provincial law into line with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. As a result, Ontario became the second province, after Qu6bec, to prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination. See RAYSIDE, supra note 75, at 143.
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gained a reputation for being hostile-especially leading up to the 1976
Olympic Games. In a 1976 raid, the police arrested everyone they en-
countered in a Montreal gay bar. 78 This raid "resulted in the arrests of
eighty-nine men and the confiscation of a membership list of seven thou-
sand men."'79 A similar raid in 1977 led to the largest street demonstra-
tion in Canada's history.80
However, the successful province-wide revision of the Qu6bec
Charter of Rights demonstrated the support of gay rights across Qu6bec,
and undermines the argument that gay rights are a geographically iso-
lated urban phenomenon that is alien and offensive to generally con-
servative agricultural communities. 81 The fact that a rural Catholic
community was willing to champion gay rights proves that political
alignments can vary widely from traditional expectations.
Canada's size, political decentralization, and linguistic duality have
made it difficult for the country to agree upon a single national identity.
Indeed, Qu6bec has held two referenda on becoming its own nation. The
first was in 1980 and the second was in 1995. While neither resulted in
the succession of Qu6bec from the Canadian federation, the 1995 refer-
endum was extremely close. Federalists won only by a vote of 50.6 per-
cent to 49.4 percent, illustrating just how fragile a federation Canada
sought to preserve. 82
Criminal law in Canada is entirely within federal jurisdiction. As a
result, Canada only ever had one sodomy law. The federal government
revised this national law in 1969, decriminalizing private same-sex sex-
ual conduct between consenting adults.83 Canada has therefore avoided
the dilemma between protecting human rights and retaining provincial
state sovereignty. In this way, Canada has been able to move beyond the
consideration of homosexuality in the criminal context, within which
much of the world is still embedded, to address other forms of sexual
orientation discrimination. Perhaps the greatest success in this area has
been the addition of sexual orientation to the Canadian Human Rights
Act. 84
The Canadian Human Rights Act was passed in 1976, providing
equality rights for federal civil servants and employees of federally regu-
78 See CARL F. STYCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL IDENTITY
POLITICS, AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 92-93 (Shane Phelan ed., Temple University Press
1998).
79 Id. at 93.
80 Id. at 92.
81 See RAYSIDE, supra note 75, at 133.
82 See STYCHIN, supra note 78, at 94.
83 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, S.C., ch. 38, § 7 (Can.).
84 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 3(1) (1985).
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lated companies, such as those in the transport and banking sectors. 85
After years of controversy, the federal Parliament finally amended the
Act in 1996 to include sexual orientation.86 However, unlike the revision
of the Qudbec Charter, amending the Canadian Human Rights Act was
not a simple matter. David Rayside offers a possible explanation for the
governing party's initial inability to resolve the issue, noting that "an
amendment on the Canadian Human Rights Act consists of two words.
Including the words 'sexual orientation' does not leave a great deal of
room for compromise. '87
A number of Canadian court judgments in the early 1990s, which
interpreted the equality provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights as
implicitly prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, strengthened the
argument that the federal Human Rights Act should be amended to ex-
pressly protect sexual orientation. 88 In particular, 1992 saw the follow-
ing decisions: the end of de facto age of consent differentials between
same sex age of consent and heterosexual age of consent, the removal of
the ban on gays and lesbians in the military, and the insistence that em-
ployers provide same-sex benefits to their employees.89 Perhaps the
strongest court support came with the Ontario judgment in Haig v. Ca-
nada,90 in which the court noted that the federal Human Rights Act had
to be interpreted to cover sexual orientation if it was to comply with the
Canadian Charter.91 The Canadian Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
Egan v. Canada,92 on the other hand, was more qualified.
In Egan, the Supreme Court of Canada decided to deny a Charter
claim for benefits to two men who had been living together for 46 years,
even though such benefits were available to unmarried opposite-sex
couples that have been living together for one year.93 On the one hand,
the court finally confirmed that the Charter implicitly covers sexual ori-
entation.94 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice La Forest noted that
whether or not sexual orientation is based on biological
or physiological factors, which may be a matter of some
controversy, it is a deeply personal characteristic that is
85 Id. (protected categories now include "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a
pardon has been granted")
86 See An Act to Amend the Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1996, c.14 (Can.).
87 RAYSIDE, supra note 75, at 135.
88 See, e.g., Haig v. Canada, 16 C.H.R.R. D/226 (Ont. Can.); see also RAYSIDE, supra
note 75, at 131.
89 RAYSIDE, supra note 75, at 131.
90 Haig, 16 C.H.R.R. D/226.
91 See id.
92 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
93 See id.
94 See id.
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either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable
personal costs, and so falls within the ambit of s. 15 pro-
tection as being analogous to the enumerated grounds.95
Justice La Forest's seemingly enlightened perspective is under-
mined, however, by his subsequent remarks that, while sexual orientation
is an analogous ground to those enumerated in the Charter, it must be a
ground which is an irrelevant personal characteristic. 96 He found the dis-
tinction to be relevant and therefore not arbitrary since the law's purpose
is to support the heterosexual couple, regardless of marriage, since it is
"the social unit that uniquely has the capacity to procreate children and
generally cares for their upbringing. '97 Yet, Justice La Forrest's points
are factually incorrect. Donor insemination has made it possible for
same-sex couples to have children. Furthermore, dead-beat dad statistics
undermine La Forest's second rationalization that only heterosexual
couples generally care for the upbringing of their children. 98 Finally,
with the current global population problem, it can hardly be helpful for
the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1995, to be harking back to notions of
the social imperative of procreation.
In contrast, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan found:
Because same sex and opposite sex couples have the
same interest in having a family and the same right to do
so, the mere fact that children of the former may be con-
ceived in a different manner than children of the latter is
insufficient, standing alone, to negate the fundamental
and overriding similarities that they share, both with re-
gard to matters relating to family and in all other re-
spects. Thus, even though procreative conduct plays an
important role in many marriages, we do not believe that
such conduct so defines the institution of marriage that
the inability to engage in that conduct is determinative of
whether same sex and opposite sex couples are similarly
situated for equal protection purposes, especially in view
of the fact that some opposite sex couples also are una-
ble to procreate, and others choose not to do so.99
This analysis provides strong support for the United States and other
nations to recognize civil rights on the basis of sexual orientation, includ-
ing same-sex marriage. The more jurisdictions that facilitate nondiscrim-
95 Id. at 21-22; see also ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 255 (Oxford University Press Inc. 1995).
96 See Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 113; see also WtNmEMUT, supra note 95, at 255.
97 Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513, at 25-26; see also WwrEMUTE, supra note 95, at 257.
98 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at 25-26.
99 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 424-25 n.19 (Conn. 2008).
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ination and equitable family relationships, the greater likelihood that
widespread human security will be achieved. Often the greatest opportu-
nity for progressive social policy-making is where broader legal change
is already on the agenda. The possible succession of Qu6bec from Ca-
nada provided such an opportunity, as has European integration. Both
facilitated government and civil society recognition and support of the
civil rights of same-sex families.
III. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND IDENTITY
European integration inspires some people, infuriates others, and
leaves many completely indifferent. The promise of an economic giant
that could compete on a global scale has motivated some people to advo-
cate for the free movement of people and ideas across borders. 100 Yet, in
the lifetimes of many contemporary adult Europeans, these boundaries
have been fiercely and violently protected. This has left many individu-
als confused and often reluctant to risk losing their national traditions.101
Furthermore, there are still more countries where basic human rights are
regularly violated than countries where such rights are effectively pro-
tected.102 However, the European integration movement stands out as a
model for grounding group identity on the notion of human rights protec-
tion rather than exclusion. 10 3 While the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 1°4 was
not the first human rights instrument, it was the first to establish institu-
tional supervision and enforcement bodies. The following discussion
will briefly trace the historical conception of European unity and search
for identity. While, it does not attempt to distill a single definition of
100 CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN THE NEW EUROPE 1 (Percy Lehning & Al-
bert Weale eds., Routledge 1997) [hereinafter CMZENSHIP].
101 Id.
102 A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (Manchester
University Press, 4th ed. 1997).
103 For example, in 1984 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on sexual discrim-
ination in the workplace, calling for European Community member states to equalize the age
of consent, and recommending the EC Commission "submit proposals to ensure that no cases
arise in the member states of discrimination against homosexuals with regard to access to
employment and working conditions." Eur. Par. Resolution 104/46, Resolution on Sexual Dis-
crimination in the Workplace, 1984 O.J. (C 104) 46-48 (EC). In 1989, the European Parlia-
ment called for the amendment of the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights to
extend to sexual orientation. 1989 O.J. (C323) 46.
104 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. It is important to note that the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms significantly predates
European Community and European Union legislation. The former was signed in 1953 by
European countries in an effort to prevent atrocities like the Holocaust. In contrast to this
human rights initiative, European Union institutions have concentrated on the economic incen-
tives of cooperation.
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what it is to be European, this analysis does seek to widen the perimeters
of the European integration debate to include those who have been
marginalized.
A. European History
Dating back to the seventh century BC, the ancient Greeks used the
word "Europe" as a geographical term. Roughly the same region became
known as the Christian Republic (Respublica Christiana) after the fall of
the Roman Empire. While Christianity certainly is not by definition Eu-
ropean, the Christian religion has played an important role in the formu-
lation of a European identity. 105 As Samuel Huntington observed,
"There was a well-developed sense of community among Western Chris-
tian peoples, one that made them feel distinct from Turks, Moors, Byzan-
tines, and others .... "106 Similarly, Ian Ward referred to Christianity as
the unifying force in Europe, noting that "the first idea of Europe, and
the one which casts the longest shadow, is the Catholic idea of a Holy
Roman Empire." 10 7 This marked the first reference to Europe as one
entitiy. Yet this unity was defined, in large part, by contrasting itself
with other entities. 10 8 According to Ward, the others were initially the
external "barbarians" of Islam, and then increasingly internal others. 109
Europe defined itself as much by this "other" as by its own sense of
rationality. Collectively, Europe saw itself as synonymous with pro-
gress, civilization, and Christian redemption. 110
Slowly, the predominant political objective shifted from maintain-
ing peace between various Catholic and Protestant regions to maintaining
peace between emerging nation-states." 1 By the end of the eighteenth
century, Europe consisted of an alliance of governments who all opposed
the creation of a single European state. 112 While identity became in-
creasingly tied to nationality, there remained a unifying effort at the Eu-
ropean level to maintain peace through a balance of power. 113
Perhaps the most well-known threat to this balance of power came
during World War II. Fascism held itself out as Europe's redeemer,
promising salvation through economic integration and the predominance
105 See Samuel P. Huntington, The West Unique, not Universal, 75 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 28,
30 (1996).
106 Id.
107 IAN WARD, THE MARGINS OF EUROPEAN LAW 10 (Palgrave Macmillan 1996).
108 See id. at 10-11.
109 See id. at 10.
110 Id. at 11.
111 See id. at 12.
112 See id. at 38-47
113 See id.
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of traditional political and cultural aspects of Europe. 114 Yet, it proved
to be a capitalist super-state that accomplished its objectives by oppress-
ing marginalized sectors of society. 115 Certain people in Europe went
beyond simply believing that objects did not have souls to thinking that
certain people did not have souls. 116 This capacity for abstraction was a
key factor that led to the Holocaust. As Samuel Pisar pointed out,
If we reflect on the fate of the Third Reich, we find that
the germs of its destruction were sown in the fact that it
had no room for the likes of Albert Einstein .... If it had
had room for their likes, it would not have become the
brutal and suicidal society we all knew. 117
Following World War II, European countries sought to exchange a
small degree of sovereignty for the promise of economic prosperity. 118
Given this objective, it is not surprising that they took a minimalist ap-
proach. The desire to be unified was limited to wanting to realize econo-
mies of scale, free movement of economic goods, and competitiveness in
the world economy. 119 Yet, integration has helped produce strong
human rights provisions in Europe.
B. European Identity Based on Human Rights and the Global Impact
of this Development
"Citizens of Europe are not simply the interpreters of traditions that
they inherit, . . . they are also the potential authors of their collective fate
in the light of some shared understandings about the human good. " 120
Social justice requires that everyone have rights apart from and, to
some extent, at odds with a market economy that seeks only to maximize
efficiency. Citizenship, however, should not be merely a legal concept
involving rights and obligations. There should also be an identity com-
ponent through which individuals feel that they are a part of a national
and international community. The contemporary notion of citizenship is
based upon the concept of the nation-state. Yet, this is not the only ap-
114 See id. at 12.
115 See id.
116 Samuel Pisar, An Open Letter to Sakharov, THE OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 1974, at 2.
117 Id.
118 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11; WARD, supra note 107, at 27. The promise of the Treaty of Rome was expanded
in 1986 when twelve European countries signed the Single European Act that committed the
signing nations to "the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital" throughout the
member nations. Single European Act art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
119 Cf. WARD, supra note 107, at 41-47. (discussing the "Common Market").
120 See CMZENSHIP, supra note 100, at 6.
FROM NONDISCRIMINATION TO CIVIL MARRIAGE
proach. An alternative vision of citizenship could be based on the notion
of human rights.
The economic arena is no longer confined to the nation-state.
Rather, the international community now operates in a global market. At
the same time, power has been consolidated into macroeconomic units.
Harold Laski points out that the "demands of modem global economics
render the nation-state economically untenable as a discrete economic
unit." 121 The driving force of European integration is certainly an eco-
nomic one-inspired by a vision of a transnational capitalist order.
However, there are a number of advocates calling for human rights to
have a central role as well. As Carl Stychin notes, freedom, democracy,
and autonomy have been "universalized and essentialized as what it
means to be European."' 122 He goes on to note that "[i]n the economic
model of citizenship, there has been little recognition of a role for the
citizen other than as a rationally self-interested, wealth-maximizing ac-
tor." 123 Yet, the European Union has sought to establish a minimum
floor of social rights. It has done so particularly by requiring new mem-
bers of the Council of Europe to ratify the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Article 8(1) of the ECHR states, "Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." 124 Ar-
ticle 8(2) goes on to provide:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interest of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. 125
The fact that there is a clear textual basis for the 'right to privacy' in
Article 8 of the European Convention reduces controversy over a court
recognizing rights on the basis of sexual orientation. This is in contrast
to countries that only have an implicit right to privacy rather than an
express privacy clause. 126
121 See WARD, supra note 107, at 27.
122 STYCHIN, supra note 78, at 122.
123 Id. at 124.
124 ECHR, supra note 104, art 8.
125 Id.
126 On the other hand, the ECHR has a rather limited scope in relation to its equal protec-
tion measures. Article 14 prohibits discrimination only in "[t]he enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in [the] Convention." ECHR, supra note 104, art. 14. Article 14 does not
have an independent status and therefore cannot be breached by itself. Instead, an Article 14
2010]
404 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19:383
In the 1981 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom decision, the European
Court of Human Rights found that Northern Ireland's sodomy law could
not be justified under Article 8(2) as necessary in a democratic society
for the protection of morals or the rights and freedoms of others.12 7 In
reaching this conclusion, the European Court of Human Rights looked to
the fact that the majority of the member states of the Council of Europe
did not have similar laws.' 2 8 It went on to note that Northern Ireland
itself had not enforced the law. 129 In similar cases brought against the
Republic of Ireland and against Cyprus, the European Court of Human
Rights reached the same conclusion in 1991 and 1993, respectively. In
Norris v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights went on to reject
the notion that a government such as Ireland's could claim that "the
moral [fiber] of a democratic nation is a matter for its own institu-
tions." 130 In Modinos v. Cyprus, the court held that the fact that Cy-
prus's law had not been enforced was irrelevant to the country's
obligation to repeal the law.' 3 '
Europe has become a leader in recognizing human rights. As new
countries have sought membership in the European Union, each has had
to address the substantial level of discrimination against sexual minori-
ties that remained pervasive and legally sanctioned within its borders.132
Between 1989, when the Council of Europe began expanding into East-
ern Europe, and 1993, compliance with the Dudgeon decision was seen
as a condition upon which membership into the Council of Europe de-
pended. 133 Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria,
and Slovenia decriminalized sodomy before applying for membership. 134
In fact, these countries had changed their laws prior to the Dudgeon deci-
sion.' 35 Other countries, including Estonia (1992), Latvia (1992), and
Lithuania (1993) revised their laws before or just subsequent to their
membership applications being accepted. 136 Romania, on the other hand,
violation can only occur in conjunction with the violation of another Article of the Convention
or Protocols. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 499 (1985); see also
WINTEMuTE, supra note 95, at 91.
127 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 165 (1981).
128 See id. at 164; WiNTEMuTE, supra note 95, at 93.
129 Dudgeon, at 158.
130 Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 199 (1991).
131 Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 490-91 (1993); see also B.B. v. United
Kingdom, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2004); L. & V. v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (2003); SL v.
Austria, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (2003).
132 See WiNr MUE, supra note 95, at 95.
133 Id. at 94.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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had not changed its penal code when it was admitted into the Council of
Europe in October 1993.137
Pursuant to Article 200 of the Romanian Penal Code, 138 both lesbi-
ans and gay men could be convicted of consensual sexual conduct and go
to prison for up to five years. 139 Beyond the conventional religious and
public morality arguments for sodomy laws, Article 200 proved to be a
strategic tool against political opponents. At a time when Amnesty Inter-
national and other human rights organizations had yet to recognize indi-
viduals imprisoned on the basis of sexual orientation as "prisoners of
conscience," the Romanian government could charge people under Arti-
cle 200 without being the subject of international criticism. 140 When
asked about Article 200, the Romanian government responded that the
sodomy provisions were no longer enforced; only through the work of
international monitoring organizations did it become clear that the
Romanian government was not telling the truth in this regard. 14 1
Beyond criminalizing private sexual conduct between consenting
adults, Article 200 prohibited speech and association supporting homo-
sexual identity. In the course of amending Article 200 in 1996, language
was added to paragraph 5 to punish "inciting or encouraging a person to
the practice of sexual relations between persons of the same-sex, as well
as propaganda or association or any other act of proselytism," with up to
five years in prison.' 4 2 When asked whether gay and lesbian rights orga-
nizations could exist under Article 200, Senator Vasile noted that "I can
hardly believe that they could obtain legal status. They are associations.
Paragraph 5 makes associations illegal."' 4 3 Magazines, publications, and
public events would similarly be prohibited under paragraph 5 of Article
200.144 While the Romanian government portrayed these changes as lib-
eralizing and in full compliance with the Council of Europe's require-
ments for admittance into the European Union, private consensual
conduct could still be punished since it need only become known for it
137 Romania entered the Council of Europe, yet entry was made conditional on the fact
that Romania would bring its law into accordance with the European Convention on Human
Rights. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended admission with
the understanding that "Romania will shortly change its legislation in such a way that...
Article 200 of the Penal Code will no longer consider as a criminal offense homosexual acts
perpetrated in private between consenting adults." Id.
138 Romanian Penal Code Art. 200, law no. 140/1996.
139 Id.
140 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUBLIC SCANDALS: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CRIMINAL
LAW IN ROMANIA 12 (1998).
141 Id. at 30.
142 Romanian Penal Code Art. 200, law no. 140/1996.
143 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 140, at 60.
144 See Romanian Penal Code Art. 200, law no. 140/1996.
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be illegal. Only after substantial international efforts did Romania even-
tually repeal Article 200.145
Sovereignty and individual human rights are not mutually exclusive,
but state recognition of human rights has evolved slowly. Ward notes
that "[t]here is nothing God-given about the nation state. They are
merely the residue of a particular European history .... simply 'a way of
imagining the world."' 146 In contrast, the Soviet paradigm saw nothing
God-given about individual human 'rights. It did not recognize natural
rights upon which the state may not infringe. Instead, citizens were
placed in a position of obedience to the state. The following observa-
tions by Samuel Pisar concerning the Soviet Union remain poignantly
relevant: "Human liberty stands higher than all commerce in the world.
On this score there must be no ambiguity. The new doubts in our minds
are over whether political detente and economic cooperation are being
built on the backs of the oppressed. 147
IV. THE SEARCH FOR A COMMUNAL IDENTITY
"Only time, familiarity, and education can make room for harmless
nonconformity and enable the majority to distinguish between those
forms of atypical behavior which actually are destructive of the social
order and those which are not. ", 148
Expanding international human rights law can come through human
rights bodies broadly interpreting existing treaty language. 149 In this re-
gard, it is important to remember that the nondiscrimination language of
human rights instruments is not exhaustive. Sexual orientation could be
found to fall within the "other status" classification of many existing
treaties. 150 In this manner jurisdictions can strengthen recognition of the
civil rights of same-sex families.
Support from mainstream human rights organizations, both govern-
mental and non-governmental, can be instrumental in raising broad pub-
145 See Council of Europe, Written Question No. 367 to the Committee of Ministers by
Mr. Van der Maelen: "Homosexual rights in Romania," CM/AS(2003)Quest367 final (March
31, 2003), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=31821&Site--COE&BackColorln-
ternet=DBDCF2&BackColorlntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864.
146 See WARD, supra note 107, at 68.
147 See Pisar, supra note 116, at 1.
148 See WIrEMUmT, supra note 95, at 241.
149 Of course, it is also possible to add additional protocols to existing human rights trea-
ties that would expressly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Alternatively, the interna-
tional community could agree on an entirely new treaty to address discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. Expanding the existing language of treaties has the advantage of build-
ing upon existing case law.
150 Aaron X. Fellmeth, Essay, Nondiscrimination as a Universal Human Right, 34 YALE
J. INT'L L. 588, 591 (2009).
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lic support for the protection of minority groups. State party reporting
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) provide an important forum in which to challenge dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Article 40 of the ICCPR
requires all state parties, including those that have not ratified the Op-
tional Protocol allowing for individual standing, to report on the progress
that the country has made in protecting the rights ensured by the
ICCPR. 151 In addition, Amnesty International and other non-govern-
mental organizations have a powerful capacity to augment official state
reports with human rights materials that document sexual orientation
discrimination.
Just as social upheaval can provide an opportunity to start over in
drafting legal provisions, the formation of new federations can offer a
similar occasion for establishing human rights provisions. European in-
tegration has its federation-forming aspects even if its members do not
wholeheartedly support the description of a federal system. The people
of Europe have experienced the social upheaval of World War II that
occurred as a result of ignoring human rights concerns. The European
Convention, which this war prompted European nations to create, is an
effort to avoid any future unifying rationale from blinding Europe to the
tragedy of human deprivation. The Quebec Charter and the South Afri-
can Constitution demonstrate that some of the most progressive change
can come at the national or even provincial level. South Africa illus-
trates how seemingly irreconcilable groups of individuals, even those
with a violent history of intolerance, can come together to enact a consti-
tution protecting rights on an unprecedented scale. 152
Both World War II and South African apartheid illustrate how con-
sensus for some of the most fundamental human rights provisions often
only occurs as a result of sobering personal experience with systemic
human rights atrocities. Ultimately, there is no world leader in the pro-
tection against sexual orientation discrimination. Rather, there seem to
be a series of political pendulums. International pendulums can cause
the realignment of national and provincial pendulums. Qudbec's protec-
tion of sexual minorities might be linked to its federal pendulum. In an
effort to distinguish itself from what its people viewed as a national dis-
regard for human rights, Qudbec may have been motivated to be more
151 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec.
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. This process enables individuals
and organizations to raise awareness about sexual orientation discrimination. For example, the
American Bar Association has submitted a report on "Discrimination Based on Sexual Orien-
tation" reflecting issues it believed the United States State Department had not addressed.
Laurence R. Heifer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a
United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARv. Hum. RTS. J. 61, 94 (1996).
152 See STYcHN, supra note 78, at 196.
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progressive than it might otherwise have been in confronting sexual ori-
entation discrimination.
Broader recognition of civil rights can result when a society puts
aside prejudices and comes to terms with what it means to live in a plu-
ralistic civil society. South African apartheid illustrates the danger of
seeking cultural homogeneity. Recognizing that the defining of a na-
tional character is a process can help a nation establish an inclusive iden-
tity. In establishing a new legal order, South Africa discovered that,
excluding any minority on the grounds of tradition could not be justified
in a country with such a tragic history of human rights abuses. For this
reason, and perhaps because it is easier to implement entirely new as-
pects of social change when legal reform is already occurring on a broad
basis, South Africa has among the most progressive national sexual ori-
entation anti-discrimination provisions in the world. In 1996, South Af-
rica became the first nation to guarantee explicit constitutional equal
protection and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. 153 This covers discrimination by both the government and private
entities. Chapter 9(1) of the South African Constitution states, "Every-
one is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law." 154 Chapter 9(3) goes on to provide: "The state may
not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, eth-
nic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth."' 155 Chapter 9(4) expands
this prohibition to private persons.'5 6
South Africa's constitutional protection on the basis of sexual orien-
tation is the first of its kind and demonstrates that if one of the most
divided nations in recent history can overcome a record of intense intol-
erance, other countries around the world can do likewise.
V. THE UNITED STATES: RECOGNIZING THE CIVIL RIGHTS
OF LGBT PEOPLE
In a rapidly changing world it is no wonder that societies are strug-
gling to retain a collective sense of identity. However, as Ward notes,
"We are all 'others', all particular, all different and all, to some degree,
excluded from one another." 157 If we study history to avoid repeating
past mistakes, one lesson is clear: Defining a national character by means
153 See Frances Raday, Secular Constitutionalism Vindicated, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2769,
2796 (2009).
154 S. Afr. Const. ch. 9(1).
155 Id. at ch. 9(3).
156 See id. at ch. 9(4).
157 WARD, supra note 107, at 116.
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of essentialism has dangerous ramifications. The exclusion of "others"
who are seemingly incompatible with a traditional vision of society does
not only harm those who are excluded, it also exhausts those who exert
their energy into rejecting people with whom they feel they cannot cope.
On a national level, a country that clings to such a means of identity is
fragile. Ultimately, change is the only constant. Recognizing that soci-
ety is in process rather than a fixed entity enables a community to move
beyond exclusion to regain the original protective rational for having a
society. In this way, provinces, countries, and the international commu-
nity as a whole can protect and integrate not only those already included,
but also suppressed members of society. This is particularly true in the
United States, which has moved haltingly in this direction.
Recently, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2009158 added sexual orientation to the protected clas-
ses under the federal hate crimes law, and enabled the United States gov-
ernment to offer financial and other assistance to localities that are
investigating and prosecuting anti-LGBT hate crimes, and to step in
when local authorities cannot, or will not, do so themselves. 159
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation.1 60 Everyone has a sexual orientation.
The fact that not everyone has the same kind of sexual orientation has led
to a great deal of anger and prejudice. While anger and prejudice are not
illegal, violence and discrimination often are. There is little opposition
to the claim that there is widespread anger and prejudice against gays and
lesbians. Whose liberty and equality is society willing to protect? What
is a legal system's response when one group argues that the only way to
protect its beliefs is for the system to refrain from protecting another
158 Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act, S. 909, 11 1th Cong. (lst Sess. 2009),
was signed into law by President Obama on October 28, 2009 as part of the Defense Authori-
zation Act. See Margaret Talev, Obama Signs Federal Gay Rights Law, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29,
2009, at A39. The law expands the federal hate-crime law to include crimes motivated by a
victim's actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. See id.
159 See Ben Pershing, Senate Passes Measure that Would Protect Gays: Obama is Ex-
pected to Sign Legislation on Hate Crimes, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2009, at A12.
160 Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Employment Laws & Policies, http://www.hrc.
org/documents/EmploymentLaws andPolicies.pdf (last updated Feb. 17, 2010) (noting that
the following twelve states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting discrimination
on account of sexual orientation and gender identity: California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washing-
ton. The following nine states prohibit discrimination on account of sexual orientation: Con-
necticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York,
and Wisconsin. In addition, six states "have an executive order, administrative order or per-
sonnel regulation prohibiting discrimination against public employees based on sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity and 3 states prohibit discrimination against public employees based on
sexual orientation only. In 22 states and the District of Columbia state employees are provided
with domestic partner benefits.").
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group's civil rights? Understanding the context of this conflict is an im-
portant part of answering these questions.
By the mid 1970s, the Federal Civil Service Commission removed
homosexual conduct as a basis for disqualification. 161 This development
stood in stark contrast to the climate of the early 1950s, when Senator
Joseph McCarthy and his colleagues caused thousands of federal workers
to be fired on allegations of homosexuality.1 62 In 1991, Amnesty Inter-
national broadened its mandate to include in its definition of "prisoners
of conscience" anyone arrested because of their homosexual identity or
for engaging in consensual private same-sex conduct.1 63 In its 1994
"Breaking the Silence" campaign, the organization strongly criticized the
United States for its high rate of anti-gay hate crimes. 164
Today, more than two million federal employees are protected by
the various federal policy statements that have prohibited sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in public employment. Furthermore, a number of
states have already forbidden sexual orientation discrimination in public
employment.165 While this does not provide uniform protection from
public employment discrimination, it demonstrates that progress is un-
derway in this field. Ending government-sanctioned employment dis-
crimination in the military, on the other hand, has met with little success,
despite the high profile that the issue has received. 166 A number of coun-
tries do not prohibit military service on the basis of sexual orientation,
including: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lith-
uania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 67
161 DEBORAH RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHics 97 (Foundation Press, 1995).
162 See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 433 n.25 (Conn. 2008) (noting
the history of "overt discrimination against gay persons by the United States government," and
that "'[i]n the 1950s and 1960s literally thousands of men and women were discharged or
forced to resign from civilian positions in the federal government because they were suspected
of being gay or lesbian."' (quoting G. CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING
TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 6 (Basic Books 2004)).
163 Helfer & Miller, supra note 151, at 90. Other human rights organizations have since
followed suit.
164 Rudy Serra, Sexual Orientation and Michigan Law, 76 MICH. B. J. 948, 950 (1997).
165 See id. at 949.
166 Knauer, supra note 9, at 52 ("The 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy mandates that all
LGBT military personnel stay in the closet under threat of separation of service and loss of
benefits."). This policy also affects the estimated one million plus LGBT veterans. See id. at
53-54 ("LGBT [veterans] report that the existence of the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy pro-
vides added pressure to be closeted when interacting with VA health care providers. They are
less likely to discuss matters involving sexual orientation or gender identity, and they are less
likely to include their partners in decision making.").
167 Human Rights Campaign, Impact of Lifting the Ban: Other Agencies and Countries
that Allow Open Service, http://www.hrc.org/issues/4882.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010); see
also Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999) (ECHR finding that the
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In the context of employment, such federal legislation as Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,168 the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 169 the Equal Pay Act of 1973 (EPA), 170 the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,171 and Title I of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 (ADA) 172 provide ample evidence that the federal gov-
ernment has the power to enact laws in the area of employment
discrimination. 173 Passage of the federal Employment Non-Discrimina-
tion Act (ENDA) would prohibit discrimination in employment based on
sexual orientation. 174 The American Bar Association, the American Psy-
chiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the Na-
tional Association of Social Workers, the National Education
Association, and the American Federation of Teachers all recommend
including sexual orientation in civil rights laws.1 75 Nancy Knauer ex-
plains that "according to an analysis of the 2000 Census data, married
elder couples earn 4.3 times more than elder same-sex couples. In addi-
tion, elder same-sex couples have 34.7 percent less retirement income
than senior married opposite-sex couples. 1 76 The federal government
has the authority and broad-based support to add sexual orientation to
protected "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classifications in federal civil
rights laws. 177
United Kingdom's preclusion of gays and lesbians from military service violated article 8 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms);
David Landau, Note, Employment Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gays: The Incomplete
Legal Responses of the United States and the European Union, 4 DuKa J. COMP. & INT'L L.
335, 342 (1994); PBS NewsHour: Pace Remarks Renew 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Debate (PBS
television broadcast Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/
jan-june07/pace_03-16.html ("While we struggle to find and keep soldiers we need, to the
point of lowering our recruiting standards and allowing people with criminal records to enter
our Armed Forces, we're actually turning away highly effective people because of a policy of
discrimination. This is a matter of our own national security interest.").
168 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
169 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (2006).
170 Id. at § 206(d).
171 See id. at §§ 701-96.
172 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
173 See Landau, supra note 167, at 350-52.
174 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (1st Sess.
2007); David Herszenhorn, House Backs Broad Protections for Gay Workers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2007, at Al (noting that a bill with language covering sexual orientation was passed by
the House in November 2007).
175 See Serra, supra note 164, at 950.
176 Knauer, supra note 9, at 11; see also id. at 13 ("Ninety percent of LGBT elders re-
ported that their primary support group consisted of close friends.... [S]uch chosen family
structures are not recognized by the law, and this produces a host of difficulties when trying to
organize and coordinate eldercare."). Restrictions are set out in various sections of federal
law. See id. at 41 n.269 (citing examples).
177 See Landau, supra note 167, at 350.
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In 1990, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Statistics Act (HCSA),
requiring the United States Department of Justice to compile and publish
statistics on hate crimes concerning race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual
orientation. 178 While HCSA compiles incidences of violence, it lacks
provisions concerning perpetrators of hate crimes and fails to establish a
cause of action for victims. HCSA may mark the first protective refer-
ence to homosexuality at the federal legislative level, but the first explicit
indication of federal commitment to end discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation did not come until the Supreme Court decision in
Romer v. Evans.179
In Romer v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court held that
Amendment 2 to the Colorado constitution violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution. 180 Incorporated into the Colorado
constitution by statewide referendum in 1992, Amendment 2 banned
nondiscrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation, at any level of
the Colorado government. 18' Like many anti-gay voter initiatives,
Amendment 2 attempted not only to repeal a law, but also to prevent the
legislature from ever reenacting a gay rights statute.
By applying rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court found that Amendment 2 did not meet the
United States Constitution's "commitment to the law's neutrality where
the rights of persons are at stake"'182 Rational basis review is applied
when a fundamental right is not burdened nor a suspect class targeted. 183
For a law to be upheld under rational basis review, the law must have a
rational connection to a legitimate governmental end.184 In a six to three
decision, the Court found that Amendment 2 lacked this rational relation-
ship to a legitimate end on two grounds. First, homosexuals had no legal
recourse since they were enjoined from challenging discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 185 Second, Amendment 2 did not meet fed-
eral constitutional requirements because the stated objective appeared to
be "inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class."' 186 The fact
178 See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2006).
179 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
180 See id. at 623.
181 See id. at 623-24 (quoting Amendment 2 to the Colorado State Constitution prohibit-
ing any level of government in Colorado to "enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.").
182 See id. at 623.
183 See id. at 631.
184 See id.
185 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996).
186 See id. at 632.
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that LGBT individuals were targeted because they were politically un-
popular did not sufficiently justify the state constitutional amendment.
Thus, the Court found that rather than furthering a legitimate legislative
goal, Amendment 2 rendered homosexuals unequal to everyone else.187
Beyond simply invalidating Amendment 2, the Supreme Court re-
jected special rights rhetoric, noting that the Court finds nothing special
in protecting homosexuals from employment, housing, and other forms
of discrimination. As Justice Kennedy recognized, "These are protec-
tions taken for granted by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them."' 188 Thus, Romer v. Evans represents long
sought after federal recognition of LGBT civil rights.189 In the aftermath
of Romer, however, voter initiatives can still repeal a gay rights law pro-
vided that they do not try to preclude the legislature from reenacting the
law.
Broader federal recognition of civil rights on the basis of sexual
orientation would provide a bulwark against such anti-gay actions. Such
federal recognition has developed significantly over the past several de-
cades, and the federal government should build on this progress and con-
tinue to strengthen provisions to provide equality for LGBT individuals
and families.
VI. STATE NONDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
In the four decades since the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 190 the enactment
of statewide nondiscrimination statutes covering sexual orientation has
changed the legal reality for gays and lesbians in the United States. 191
The first protection against sexual orientation discrimination was estab-
lished on the local level by a 1972 ban on employment discrimination
against gays and lesbians in East Lansing, Michigan. 192 Since the early
187 See id. at 635.
188 See id. at 631.
189 See Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing The Impact Of Judicial Decisions
On LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 151, 180 (2009) (noting the LGBT rights move-
ment's response to a rash of similar bans on antidiscrimination laws "with multiple state and
federal legal challenges, raising both procedural and substantive objections to these antigay
initiatives. After several preliminary victories in state courts, this litigation campaign
culminated in Romer v. Evans, the 1996 Supreme Court decision invalidating Colorado's
Amendment 2.").
190 The Stonewall Riots are widely seen as the symbolic start of the gay rights movement
in the United States. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Elder Law: Toward Equity in Aging,
32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 4 n. 14 (2009).
191 Cf. Keck, supra note 189, at 178-79 ("For at least 30 years-since the Gallup Poll
began asking the question in 1977-a majority of the public has agreed that 'homosexuals
should ... have equal fights in terms of job opportunities.' For the past 15 years, the level of
support has exceeded 80 percent.").
192 See Safe School Coalition, A Living Memory LGBT History Timeline, available at
www.safeschoolscoalition.org/LivingMemory-lgbtHistoryTimeline.pdf
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1970s many municipalities have extended such protection. Efforts to
broaden protection beyond the local level, on the other hand, remained
largely unsuccessful until the 1990s. Until the late 1980s, only Wiscon-
sin was able to enact a statewide nondiscrimination statute covering sex-
ual orientation.1 93 In 1989, Massachusetts became the second state to
protect gays and lesbians through a statewide general nondiscrimination
statute. 194 As of 2009, twenty-one states had such laws. 195 Additionally,
the District of Columbia has similar provisions.196
A. Varying Construction of State Statutes
Many states have added the term "sexual orientation" to existing
nondiscrimination laws. California provides an illustrative example.
While California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) 197 pro-
vides a general prohibition of discrimination, it originally did not extend
to sexual orientation. 98 Sections 1101 and 1102 of the California Labor
Code, on the other hand, had been read to cover sexual orientation dis-
crimination.1 99 The Labor Code provisions did so by protecting LGBT
rights as rights of employees to engage in "political activity" pursuant to
the California Supreme Court's 1979 holding in Gay Law Students Asso-
ciation v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company,2° where the court
concluded that openly expressing one's homosexuality falls within the
Labor Code's definition of a political activity. Lower courts in Califor-
nia subsequently extended such coverage to all homosexuals, regardless
of whether or not a specific person is openly gay. 20' In 1992, the Cali-
fornia legislature codified Gay Law Students, and its protection of gays
and lesbians from discrimination, by enacting section 1102.1 of the La-
193 See id.
194 See 1989 Mass. Acts 516 (An Act Making It Unlawful to Discriminate on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation).
195 See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the U.S,
http:/www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/non-discrimination 7_09_color.
pdf (last updated July 1, 2009).
196 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1402 (Lexis 2009).
197 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 2005).
198 Development in the Law: Employment Discrimination, Statutory Protection for Gays
and Lesbians in Private Employment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1625, 1627 (1996) [hereinafter De-
velopment in the Law].
199 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101-02 (West 2005); Development in the Law, supra note
198, at 1627-28.
200 Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company, 595 P.2d. 592,
599 (Cal. 1979); see Developments in the Law, supra note 198, at 1627-28.
201 See, e.g., Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 36 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993); see Developments in the Law, supra note 198, at 1627-28.
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bor Code,202 and in 1999, it ultimately incorporated sexual orientation
into FEHA.20 3
Generally, states have taken one of the following two approaches:
incorporate a Title VII-like statute into their state legislation and include
sexual orientation in the list of protected groups, or enact a freestanding
statute covering sexual orientation discrimination. Minnesota's statute
demonstrates the first approach. The Minnesota law provides that it is an
unfair employment practice
[f]or an employer, because of race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to
public assistance, membership or activity in a local com-
mission, disability, sexual orientation, or age, (1) to re-
fuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment
which unreasonably excludes a person seeking employ-
ment; or (2) to discharge an employee; or (3) to discrimi-
nate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure,
compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or
privileges of employment.2 0 4
Since sexual orientation is incorporated into the existing general employ-
ment nondiscrimination statute, courts can use existing case law pursuant
to the statute as guidance in interpreting cases that concern sexual
orientation.
Similarly, New Hampshire's general employment nondiscrimination
statute was amended to provide that
[n]o person shall be appointed or promoted to, or de-
moted or dismissed from, any position in the classified
service, or in any way favored or discriminated against
with respect to employment in the classified service be-
cause of the person's political opinions, religious beliefs
or affiliations, age, sex, or race. In addition, no person
shall have any such employment action taken on account
of such person's sexual orientation. 20 5
While New Hampshire has attached an entire sentence to the list of pro-
tected classifications, the effect is comparable to that of Minnesota.
Thus, by adding the term "sexual orientation" to an existing statute,
states such as Minnesota and New Hampshire have the advantage of
202 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1(a), repealed by 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 592, § 12 (prohibit-
ing discrimination "or different treatment in any aspect of employment or opportunity for
employment based on sexual orientation"); see Developments in the Law, supra note 198, at
1627-28
203 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE. § 12920, 12921 (West 2005).
204 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2004).
205 N.H. REV. STAT. § 21-1:52 (2005).
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dealing with employment discrimination entirely within one statutory
scheme.
In contrast, Connecticut's statute demonstrates the second, free-
standing approach. Connecticut General Statute Section 46a-81c pro-
vides that
[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this
section: For an employer, by himself or his agent, except
in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or
need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge
from employment any individual or to discriminate
against him in compensation or in terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of the individual's
sexual orientation or civil union status. 206
The statute also prohibits employment agencies, labor organizations, and
private persons from similar discriminatory employment acts based on
sexual orientation.20 7
While it is easier to verse oneself on the legal treatment of gays and
lesbians under Connecticut law, since various forms of sexual orientation
discrimination are conveniently located within a single statute, courts do
not have as strong an argument to look to existing case law under the
general nondiscrimination statute when interpreting a case concerning
sexual orientation. For instance, a court does not necessarily need to
look to bona fide occupational qualification analysis under Title VI120 8 or
the general Connecticut nondiscrimination statute for guidance when in-
terpreting what the Connecticut sexual orientation statute means by
"need." Instead, courts may choose to grant broad discretion when deter-
mining what an employer must do to show need. Ultimately, each ap-
proach has its advantages and disadvantages that will become
increasingly clear as a body of case law continues to develop from courts
interpreting these statutes.
B. Anti-Gay Language
A regretful component of the state statutes that have extended non-
discrimination coverage to gays and lesbians is the inclusion of language
that undermines the very nondiscriminatory nature of these statutes. For
example, Minnesota and Rhode Island insist that passage of their nondis-
crimination statutes does not mean that these states condone homosexu-
206 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(a)-81(c) (West 2009).
207 See id.
208 The bona fide occupational qualification permits discrimination (that would generally
not be allowed under Title VII) if the discrimination is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C 2000e-2(e)(l) (2006).
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ality.20 9 Beyond being insulting, this language codifies the very
prejudice that the statutes seek to address. Mixner argues against such
institutionalized discrimination and notes that we can
tip-toe through so that they don't notice us this year. If
you want that strategy, we can do it. But please stand up
if you are willing to give up your social security rights.
Please stand up if you would like not to be by the bed-
side of your partner when they die. Please stand up if
you would like to pay more taxes because you are gay.
... You know I grew up in my time, in a town where
there were signs for white and colored drinking foun-
tains. And there were white and black sections in the
movie theaters, and at the bus stations and so forth, and
everyone assumed that that's just the way it was, and it
was going to be that way forever. Guess what, they were
wrong, and they were wrong because people refused to
accept the deformation that they had for us. 210
Despite the rationales for a cautious approach, the fact remains that
how one asks for protection affects what kind of protection one will
receive.
VII. BALANCING THE PROTECTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS VIS A VIS
THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FAITH
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ,,211 Through the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation
doctrine, these provisions protect religious autonomy from state as well
as federal government intervention. At the very least, the words of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause together create a
zone of protection for religious faith.212 In the free exercise context,
209 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.27 (West 2004) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to . . . mean the state of Minnesota condones homosexuality or bisexuality or any
equivalent lifestyle."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(15) (2001) (" 'Sexual orientation' means hav-
ing or being perceived as having an orientation for heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexu-
ality .... This definition does not confer legislative approval of that status, but is intended to
assure the basic human rights of persons to obtain and hold employment, regardless of that
status.").
210 David B. Mixner, A Public Lecture: It Is Time to Tell The Truth, 32 NOVA L. REV.
541, 551-52 (2008). See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Sexual Politics And Social
Change, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1523 (2009).
211 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
212 See id.
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laws that infringe religious autonomy must at least be neutral and gener-
ally applicable. 213
The nation is sharply divided over when formally neutral laws
should have religious exemptions and when providing basic civil rights
constitutionally justifies infringing on religious faith. Can state nondis-
crimination statutes stand alone without religious exemptions and if not,
where must the boundaries of such exemptions fall in order for the stat-
ute to survive constitutional attack?
A. Religious Exemptions under Statewide Nondiscrimination Statutes
Provisions to allow religious exemptions from nondiscrimination
statutes on the basis of sexual orientation have varied widely from state
to state. For instance, Vermont offers a very restricted exemption, al-
lowing religious organizations to give preference to their members in
employment matters, but otherwise it prohibits discrimination. The Ver-
mont statute provides:
The provisions of this section prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity
shall not be construed to prohibit or prevent any relig-
ious or denominational institution or organization, or any
organization operated for charitable or educational pur-
poses, which is operated, supervised, or controlled by or
in connection with a religious organization, from giving
preference to persons of the same religion or denomina-
tion or from taking any action with respect to matters of
employment which is calculated by the organization to
promote the religious principles for which it is estab-
lished or maintained. 214
Vermont's exemption is narrowly defined compared to other states, such
as New Jersey.
The New Jersey employment discrimination statute states that
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a
club exclusively social or fraternal to use club member-
ship as a uniform qualification for employment, or for a
religious association or organization to utilize religious
affiliation as a uniform qualification in the employment
of clergy, religious teachers or other employees engaged
in the religious activities of the association or organiza-
tion, or in following the tenets of its religion in establish-
213 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990).
214 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (West 2007).
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ing and utilizing criteria for employment of an
employee. 215
In contrast to Vermont, New Jersey exempts social clubs and fraternities
as well as religious groups.
In contrast to New Jersey's broad coverage, New Hampshire simply
added a vague statement to its classification of sexual orientation as pro-
tected status under its anti-discrimination laws. In defining sexual orien-
tation as "having or being perceived as having an orientation for
heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality," Section 21:49 of the
New Hampshire anti-discrimination statute goes on to state that this does
not "impose any duty on a religious organization." 216 This ambiguity
will require significant judicial interpretation before residents of New
Hampshire will know the parameters of the exemption.
While judicial interpretation is needed to identify what these various
statutes permit, the following spectrum provides a rough comparison be-
tween religious exemptions. States such as Vermont fall at one end of
the spectrum, providing a very narrow religious exemption with respect
to sexual orientation. 217 Other states, including New Jersey and New
Hampshire, fall at the opposite end of the spectrum, providing broad re-
ligious exemptions. 218 Rhode Island and California appear to have taken
the middle road in allowing preferential hiring of individuals who are of
the same religion, but only with regard to employment related to the
organization's religious activities. 219 Connecticut may also fall within
this middle category. In Section 46a-8 1p of its employment nondiscrimi-
nation statute, Connecticut states that
[tihe provisions of sections 4a-60a and 46a-81a to 46a-
81o, inclusive, shall not apply to a religious corporation,
entity, association, educational institution or society with
respect to the employment of individuals to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corpora-
tion, entity, association, educational institution or society
of its activities, or with respect to matters of discipline,
faith, internal organization or ecclesiastical rule, custom
or law which are established by such corporation, entity,
association, educational institution or society. 220
215 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2007).
216 N.H. REV. STAT. § 21:49 (2005).
217 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
219 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(7)(ii) (2009); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12922 (West 2005) (ex-
empting religious organizations for jobs "involving the performance of religious duties").
220 CONN. GEN. STAT. ArNN. § 46a-81p (West 2009).
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Given this language, it is conceivable that a court will assess the relig-
ious nature of a job rather than the religious status of the organization,
potentially limiting the nondiscrimination exemption.
B. Religion and the United States Constitution
Prior to 1990, the Free Exercise Clause was understood to require
that any statute that substantially burdened religious activity must have a
compelling state interest.22' The 1990 Supreme Court holding in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith severely restricted use of the compelling state
interest test.2 22 Smith concluded that a generally applicable state law that
is facially neutral does not infringe upon the Free Exercise Clause. 223
Religious beliefs cannot justify violating a generally applicable, neutral
law. Instead, a religious individual or organization will only prevail on a
free exercise challenge if the law in question is directed at religious prac-
tice. Congress reacted to the Smith decision by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 224 This statute had the direct
intention of overturning Smith and reinstituting the use of the compelling
state interest test for laws that burden religious activity under the Free
Exercise Clause. 225 Under RFRA, if a justification for a state or federal
law that substantially burdened a religious activity was not compelling,
then it fell under RFRA's automatic statutory exception. Yet, RFRA has
been ruled unconstitutional with respect to state governmental actions by
City of Boerne v. Flores.226
A spectrum of authority has developed in regard to the intersection
of claims of religious exemptions and otherwise generally applicable
law. On one end of the spectrum, the government has authority over
activity that is commercial in nature.227 At the other end of the spectrum,
221 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
222 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-89 (1990).
223 See id. at 879-80, 882-85.
224 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
225 Section 2000bb-1 of RFRA stated that:
(a) In general: Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Id. § 2000bb-1.
226 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding that Congress had surpassed its
Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five power because it did not properly "enforce" the free
exercise law set forth in Smith).
227 See David B. Cruz, Note, Piety and Prejudice: Free Exercise Exemption from Laws
Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1180 (1994).
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religious organizations have authority over their own doctrinal transmis-
sion activities. 228 When religious activity has commercial components it
has been hard to determine where along the spectrum the case falls.
Religious beliefs are not a total bar to government regulation. As
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Lee, each individual does not
enjoy unlimited protection of religious faith.229 Furthermore, when relig-
ious individuals choose to engage in commercial activity, the limits they
impose on their own activity cannot be imposed upon the generally ap-
plicable statutory scheme. 230 Lee was a member of the Old Order
Amish. 231 Both he and his Amish employees felt compelled by their
religious beliefs to refrain from partaking in the social security system. 232
Thus, Lee did not withhold social security taxes from his employee's
wages and he did not pay the employer's share of his worker's social
security taxes.233 In response to an IRS bill for the unpaid taxes, Lee
brought a free exercise claim that the government was precluded from
requiring social security payments. 234 While the Supreme Court agreed
that Lee's religious beliefs would be infringed, the Court found that it
was constitutional to do so since the government had an overriding inter-
est in a workable tax system.235
While Lee clarifies that within a commercial zone the government
has broader discretion to act in ways that may infringe upon religious
beliefs, there also exists a zone of doctrinal transmission in which the
government cannot interfere, under the Free Exercise Clause. 236 Instead,
religious individuals and organizations have much authority over individ-
uals with whom they will associate and what communication will be per-
mitted. 237 This zone includes such activities as preaching, praying,
proselytizing, and worshipping within a group.238 For example, in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, three Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted of
breaking a Connecticut law that prohibited religious solicitations without
approval from local authorities. 239 The Supreme Court noted that, while
228 See id. at 1201; see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
229 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, at 258-61 (1982) (rejecting a free exercise
challenge brought by a member of the Old Order Amish against a federal tax); see also Smith,
494 U.S. at 880..
230 Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
231 See id. at 254.
232 See id. at 254-55.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-61 (1982).
236 See Cruz, supra note 227, at 1201.
237 See id.
238 Id. 1203.
239 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300 (1940) (holding that the fundamental
Fourteenth Amendment notion of liberty encompasses "the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment"); see also Cruz, supra note 227, at 1201-02.
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governmental authority may infringe upon religious conduct, Connecti-
cut was not permitted to give an official an unrestricted right to refuse
licenses for religious solicitation. 240 In reversing the convictions, the
Court went on to find that the breadth of Connecticut's breaching the
peace provisions "unduly suppress free communication of views, relig-
ious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions." '241
The Court held that governmental regulation in the zone of doctrinal
transmission must be "narrowly drawn to define and punish specific con-
duct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of
the State." 242 Thus, Cantwell and the cases that follow do not afford
religious individuals and institutions a general exemption from regula-
tion.24 3 Instead, it clarifies the limitations to governmental infringement
within the zone of doctrinal transmission.
Religious exemptions from employment nondiscrimination statutes
appear to be permissible primarily within the limited sphere of doctrinal
transmission activities, such as gays and lesbians in the ministry. 244 De-
termining when a person's religious faith leads to the violation of other
people's basic civil rights is not a unique question to the gay rights de-
bate. Similar religious objections have been brought against race and
gender civil rights measures. 245
C. Scriptures in Context
While Leviticus expressly permits slavery, we no longer find this
text to be a sufficient reason for enslaving people. 246 Yet, this section of
the Bible is regularly used to condemn LGBT people.247 Jay Michaelson
discusses the evolutionary understanding of religious development and
proposes that only by entering into a conversation that discusses religious
240 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305-06; see also Cruz, supra note 227, at 1201-02.
241 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308; Cruz, supra note 227, at 1202.
242 Id. at 311; Cruz, supra note 227, at 1203.
243 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
244 Cruz, supra note 227, at 1205.
245 Id. at 1179 n.13 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Pac. Press Publ'n Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th
Cir. 1982) (denying a free exercise claim against Title Vl's ban on sex discrimination);
Brown v. Dade Christian Sch., Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1977) (denying a free exercise
claim against prohibition of racial discrimination in 42 U.S.C. § 1981)).
246 See, e.g., Leviticus 25:44-46 (King James).
247 Foreman, supra note 26, at 563 (stating that the Bible was once used to justify slavery
and that "[tioday, seven of the more than one million verses in the Bible are deliberately
misinterpreted to justify anti-gay animus, and the airwaves are full of preachers misquoting
Leviticus and Saint Paul ... ") (citing DANIEL A. HELMINIAK, WHAT THE BIBLE REALLY SAYS
ABOUT HOMOSEXuALITY (Alamo Square Press 1994) (concluding that a proper examination of
The Bible reveals that it cannot legitimately be used to support the condemnation of homosex-
uality); MEL WHIE, WHAT THE BIBLE SAYS-AND DOESN'T SAY-ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY,
http://www.soulforce.orglpdf/whatthebiblesays.pdf (explaining that many Americans miscon-
strue the Biblical verses that mention same-sex behavior and that these verses neither condone
nor disparage homosexuality)).
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categories and assumptions can personal experience transcend those as-
sumptions. 248 The number of people who said they knew no gays or
lesbians dropped from 54% to 27% over the past two decades. 249
Michaelson contends, "What is required is not third person argumenta-
tion but first-person testimony. '250 Bishop Gene Robinson251 explains
that "those who believe that the 2,000-year tradition against homosexual-
ity argues against change forget that the Church has changed its under-
standing of some very important teachings that it has held for countless
centuries. For instance, the Church for nearly 2,000 years took seriously
Jesus' words that remarriage after divorce was adultery. '252
Four of the biblical passages most commonly cited to indicate that
the Bible holds a position against homosexuality forbid worshipping for-
eign gods. 253 Only through an inaccurate translation of the Hebrew term
"qadheshim" into the word "sodomite" have these passages come to be
associated with condemning homosexuality. 254 "Qadheshim" means
"holy," and in these texts, the term refers to the "sacred ones" who were
temple prostitutes in Canaanite fertility ceremonies. As God's "chosen
people," Israelites were bound to God by a covenant. This pact required
Jewish people to refrain from participating in the religious practices of
Gentiles. This included not taking part in conduct, such as male homo-
sexual activity, which was associated with Canaanite rituals.255
248 See Jay Michaelson, Chaos, Law, and God: The Religious Meanings of Homosexual-
ity, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 41, 113-19 (2008).
249 Id. at 116.
250 Id.
251 Robinson was the first openly gay bishop appointed in the Episcopal Church, whose
appointment has caused a schism in the church. See Laurie Goodstein, Episcopal Vote Re-
opens a Door To Gay Bishops, N.Y. TuMEs, Jul. 15, 2009, at All.
252 V. Gene Robinson, A Public Lecture: Why Religion Matters in the Civil Rights Debate
for Gays and Lesbians, 32 NOVA L. REv. 573, 582 (2008). Robinson also notes:
According to the Holiness Code of Leviticus, many things were an "abomination" to
God, including the eating of pork. That was not to say that eating pork was innately
wrong, but that it was to be one of the ways Jews were constantly reminded that they
were different, a separate chosen people of God, and in so observing these dietary
laws, would be reminded of this special relationship to God. Likewise, they were
not to eat shellfish, plant two kinds of seed in the same field, or wear two kinds of
cloth simultaneously.
Id. at 579-80.
253 MICHAEL NAVA & ROBERT DAWIDOFF, CREATED EQUAL: WHY GAY RIGHTS MATrER
TO AMERICA 106 (St. Martin's Press 1994) (noting that the four biblical passages are Deuter-
onomy 23:17, I Kings 14:24, I Kings 22:46, and II Kings 23:7).
254 THOMAS C. CARAMAGNO, IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?: INTELLECTUAL STALEMATE
IN THE GAY RiGrrs DEBATE 48 (Praeger 2002); see also id. at 48-50.
255 HELMINIAK, supra 247, at 100; see also CARAMAGNO, supra note 254, at 48; Michael-
son, supra note 248, at 60-61 (noting that "the 'sin of Sodom' is not on its face, and was
almost never understood by other Biblical texts or Biblical commentators, to be such....
Scholars have generally understood the sin of Sodom as selfishness and inhospitality.").
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Leviticus is a Holiness Code proscribing the manner in which the
Israelites were to set themselves apart from Gentile culture. In the King
James Bible translation of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13, male homosexual-
ity is called an abomination. 256 The Hebrew word for abomination, how-
ever, does not mean something fundamentally evil. Rather, the term is
used in relation to something that is ritually unclean for a Jewish person,
such as eating pork.2 5 7 Chapter 18 of Leviticus begins by saying, "After
the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do: and
after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not
do."'258 People misinterpret the Bible when they turn a matter of Jewish
cultural convention into a universal ethical issue.
Those who repeatedly refer to Leviticus as condemning homosexu-
als ignore other requirements promulgated in Leviticus. These require-
ments include not eating pork, not planting two different kinds of seed in
the same field, and not weaving two different kinds of fiber together.259
If fundamentalists seek to advocate that Americans live by the purity
laws of Leviticus then they should be equally adamant in eradicating the
practice of eating ham or bacon. Similarly, everyone should throw away
any article of clothing that is not woven entirely from a single kind of
fabric. 260
Contemporary fundamentalists relying on biblical quotations to jus-
tify anti-gay sentiment is as fatuous as quoting Leviticus to justify slav-
ery. It would be preposterous to argue in favor of such a position,
despite such passages of Leviticus as:
Both thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids, which thou shalt
have, shall be of the heathen that are around about you;
of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids .... And
ye shall take them as an inheritance for your children
after you, to inherit them for a possession, they shall be
your bondmen forever .... 261
256 See Leviticus 18:22 (King James) ("Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with woman-
kind; it is abomination."); id. 20:13 ("If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood
shall be upon them.").
257 NAVA & DAWIDOFF, supra note 253, at 106.
258 Leviticus 18:3 (King James).
259 See id. at 11:7 (prohibition on pork), 19:19 (prohibition on "mingled seed" and gar-
ments "garment mingled of linen and woolen").
260 In the desert region, where Sodom was located, it could be fatal to remain outside all
night. Thus, people were responsible for upholding a very strict rule of hospitality that forbade
anyone from harming someone who had been offered shelter for the night. HELmtinAK, supra
note 247, at 41 (noting that, understood in its historical context, 1 Corinthians and 1 Timothy
teach that abusive forms of both homosexual and heterosexual conduct is forbidden).
261 Leviticus 25:44-46 (King James).
FROM NONDISCRIMINATION TO CIVIL MARRIAGE
Those who condemn gays and lesbians based upon passing biblical
references to homosexual conduct ignore lengthy passages, including the
entire epistle to Philemon, that appear to support slavery. 262 This is not
to say that the Bible should be read literally and that slavery should be
reinstated. Rather, it demonstrates the inherent inconsistency that results
from relying on fundamental, literal interpretations of the Bible for moral
guidance.
The Bible serves as an approach to moral guidance. Just as it has
throughout history, the Bible will continue to direct individuals to di-
verging perspectives and choices. The Constitution exists to protect the
free exercise of religious beliefs, but it also protects the individuals who
hold them from other people's effort to require a different interpretation.
Regardless of one's interpretation of the Bible or any other religious text,
the role of law in a secular state is not to criminalize one religion's no-
tion of sin, even if the majority of the nation belongs to a religion that
condemns a given conduct.2 63
Liberal democracy consists of two important components. The first
part is the liberal notion of freeing the people and the second part is the
democratic notion of empowering the people. Liberal democracy pro-
vides both "demo-protection," which protects people from tyranny, and
"demo-power," which implements popular rule.264 John Locke noted
that rights naturally belong to each person, and because they have not
been given to the community, they cannot be restricted or refused by the
state. 265 There are a number of arguments used to justify the notion that
rights are inalienable. One approach is to derive such inalienability from
the Bible, which identifies God-given rights. Christianity, however, does
not provide a universal foundation for morality. While there is no uni-
versal religious truth, as Robertson and Merrills point out, "It]he idea of
individual worth can be found in the work of sages, philosophers,
prophets and poets from different countries and many faiths in all conti-
nents. .... ",266 In an effort to provide an expression of a universal truth,
262 See Philemon (King James); see also Ephesians 6:5-9 (King James); Colossians
3:22-24 (King James); 1 Timothy 6:1-2 (King James); I Peter 2:18 (King James) (referring to
"servants").
263 See Serra, supra note 164, at 951.
264 Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Government Travel?, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1995,
at 101-02; see also Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate
Over Human Rights and Asian Values, 1 IHARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998).
265 See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge University Press 1960) (1690) (arguing that people have a natural right to life, liberty,
and property, and that legitimate government exists by the consent of the people through the
social contract theory).
266 ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 102, at 8.
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Kant secularized the notion that people have inalienable rights, basing
his theory on the fact that humans are rational beings. 267
To Kant, rights are universal and are based upon the combined no-
tions of freedom and equality. 268 He explained that the notion of free-
dom provides a foundation of universal ethics based upon reciprocal
duty.269 This notion can be found in the New Testament of the Bible in
the form of Christ's expression of the Golden Rule: Do unto others as
you would have them do unto you. 2 0 The Analects of Confucius says
never do to the other what you would not like them to do to you. 27 1
Kant's secular version says to act only if you want your actions to be
universal. 272
Kant explained that rights are indivisible. 273 In other words, one's
own right is exactly the same right as the right of the "other. ' 274 Hannah
Arendt reworked Kant's theory in relation to participatory democracy. 275
Arendt notes that to achieve total domination, a state will attempt to treat
humanity as if it is merely one individual. 276 The first step in this pro-
cess is to exclude the "other" from the legal process. 277 Ultimately, how-
ever, denying legal rights to any individual denies legal rights to
everyone. 278
D. Lessons from Religious Accommodations
Making a distinction between sexual orientation and sexual conduct
does not legitimize discrimination. Just as religion has long been an in-
visible yet contentious characteristic, sexual orientation has become
"morally polarizing. '279 The United States has made significant strides
in coming to terms with religious diversity. The notion that there is more
than one valid religious approach and that the path one chooses is not the
267 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith
trans., St. Martin's Press 1965) (1781) (arguing that because all people are rational beings, all
people are equal).
268 IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 74 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet
trans., 1971).
269 Id.
270 Cf. Matthew 7:12 (King James).
271 See THE ANALECTS OF CONFUClus XV 24 (Burton Watson trans., Columbia University
Press 2007)
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FROM NONDISCRIMINATION TO CIVIL MARRIAGE
deciding factor to moral worth is now widely held. Yet, a similar con-
sensus does not exist that it is acceptable to have a variety of equally
valid sexual orientations. Furthermore, many Americans have yet to em-
brace the notion that one's sexuality is irrelevant to one's moral worth.
Many current mainstream religious organizations today were once
targets of hatred and prejudice. It is no more true to claim that the major-
ity sexual orientation is universally true and that other orientations are
immoral than it was to claim that the majority religion was universally
true and that other religions were immoral.
CONCLUSION
"[Pleople all over the world risk machine gunfire, long lines, beat-
ings, to vote and change this world for a better place. 280
Human rights are universal, interrelated, interdependent, and indi-
visible. Governments should ensure that that all persons are accorded
legal capacity in civil matters and that no one is arbitrarily deprived of
life or security of the person, whether inflicted by government officials
or by any individual or group. 281
A community can be assessed not only by the characteristics that
make up its majority, but by the way in which it treats its minorities. It is
a sad commentary that it took an event as horrendous as the Holocaust to
establish something as basic as The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. It is well known that the Nazis targeted Jewish people. Yet
fewer people are aware of the fact that homosexuals were also singled
out for extermination. 282 Approximately one hundred thousand men
were identified as gay and sent to concentration camps. 283 These men
were made to wear a pink triangle. Several thousand lesbians were also
among the many shot, gassed, worked, or starved to death in the
camps. 2 8 4 These women were not identified as homosexuals, but rather
as "anti-social elements. '285 They wore black triangles, as did vagrants
and petty criminals.286 Protecting the rights of individuals based on sex-
ual orientation would advance the "equal and inalienable rights" pursuant
280 Mixner, supra note 210, at 549.
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to the Universal Declaration. 287 Protection of civil society generally, and
minority groups in particular, is crucial to achieving good governance.
Recognition of the civil rights of same-sex families can become uni-
versal through the expansion of general non-discrimination statutes that
provide protection on the basis of sexual orientation, as well as through
broad recognition of same-gender civil marriages. Jurisdictions that have
yet to pass such provisions should look to existing state statutes and best
practices around the world to establish a legal framework with which to
secure the civil rights of LGBT individuals, families, and communities.
This can be done by replacing discriminatory laws like DOMA with eq-
uitable laws that recognize legal relationships within same-sex families,
including medical consent and inheritance. The institution that already
establishes broad legal recognition of such relationships is civil marriage.
This constitutional right288 can be extended to same-gender couples with-
out further delay, as can non-discriminatory second parent adoption pro-
visions. Ultimately, all jurisdictions should explicitly clarify that LGBT
individuals and same-sex families have the same civil rights as other
members of society.
This Article has considered a range of ways in which sexual orienta-
tion has been addressed at provincial, national, and international levels.
It has looked at decriminalization of same-sex activity between con-
senting adults, nondiscrimination measures, and civil marriage for same-
sex couples. Recognizing these rights can help alter the emphasis from
negative stereotypes to an appreciation that there are multiple approaches
to leading a moral life. This realization has already caused significant
legal climate change. Some people think the glacial pace of progress is
chilling. Others swear that we are already fanning the flames of Hell.
Courts will play an important role over the next several years in weigh-
ing the concerns of sexual orientation and religious protection. May they
find the wisdom to recognize and protect the rights of LGBT people and
may members of society find common ground to live together equitably.
Governments and civil society can facilitate such understanding by
working towards universal recognition of the civil rights of LGBT indi-
viduals and same-sex families.
287 See G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948).
288 Cf Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the right to marry in the con-
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